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 Abstract  
 
The globalization debate of the nineties has given way recently to the concept and 
reality of empire.  The ground for the shift was prepared by the increasing attention 
paid to military globalization as opposed to the neo-liberal paradise of a borderless 
world.  Not only is the state back, but the state is back in its most military and most 
externally-oriented form in discussions of empire.  Yet there are increasing difficulties 
in employing the seemingly obsolescent concept of empire.  Must this concept 
undergo merely a series of cosmetic transformations given the underlying reality of 
state power and power politics or is a postmodern transformation of the concept either 
desirable or possible?  In this paper the juridical transformation of the concept as 
envisaged by Hardt and Negri is analysed in the context of the interpretation of the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo as an event in the foundation of a new world order. 
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 The key debates of the fifties concerned organization and modernization.  The sixties 
were a time of liberation and dependency theory.  The seventies were the crisis 
decades, and capitalism reinvented itself, or indeed disorganized itself, as the 
postmodernist debate took off in the eighties.  In the nineties globalization reinvented 
modernization theory and became the focal point of attention (Alexander 1995).  
September 11 saw the ascendancy of empire.  It is yet another irony of history 
presumably that we seem to begin a millennium with intimations of empire: the 
Romans greeted the first millennium; Charlemagne the second; and the Americans the 
third.  The Roman Empire still exists in truncated form in the shape of the Roman 
Catholic Church; some have interpreted Charlemagne as the first aborted attempt at a 
European Union; and the Americans have flirted with imperialism with a bad 
republican conscience since 1898. Yet history never repeats itself even as farce, so the 
argument of this paper is that even as we turn to the concept of empire the specific 
novelty of the new global arrangement needs to be recognized and the temptation to 
slide into the comfortable left thematic of imperialism must be eschewed. 
 
There is yet another key shift that has marked the post-war period: the shift from 
Keynesian-welfarist, fordist or corporatist styles of governance to that of monetarist-
warfarist, post-fordist or network styles of governance.  It is not always clear if the 
new forms of governance are more programmatic than real, and to what extent their 
programmatic quality hides real continuities.  In this context, the renewed interest in 
the concept of capitalism is not so much an historical interest, but an awareness that 
the radical nature of recent changes are a part of a longer history of a non-exhausted 
and seemingly rejuvenated social form (Arnason: 2001).  The same is true of the 
concept of empire.  It would be wrong to see the ‘Project for a New American 
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Century’ as a blueprint for empire, but neither is it just another website given the 
current but not uncontested fascination with characterizing American global power as 
imperial (Joxe 2002: 100-09; and Todd: 2002: 75-96).  In order to grasp the 
discontinuity within continuity, Hardt and Negri talk of empire rather than 
imperialism; and indeed with this shift they move from the realm of a world systems 
analysis to that of governance (Hardt & Negri 2000).  Analogously to the work of 
Albrow, they shift from the realm of process – globalization or imperialism – to that 
of a new constitution – the global age or empire (Albrow 1997).  There are theoretical 
reasons for this (the avoidance of historicism), but more importantly there is a 
recognition that the ‘new’ can be characterised with something more precise than the 
prefix ‘post’.  The re-emergence of the power of the noun over that of the verb is a 
recognition that the activity of naming has begun. 
 
In what follows I will only deal with a dissection of the concept of empire as a 
political or jurisprudential act via the introduction of some critical counterpoints and 
through an exploration of a case study of Kosovo as a putatively foundational event of 
empire. 
 
I 
 
Despite some appearances to the contrary, Empire is a work of jurisprudence.  It 
charts the rise of a new form of imperial sovereignty out of the ashes of the 
Westphalian order.  It begins with Kelsen, but is written under the sign of Schmitt and 
in the spirit of Polybius.  The triumph of the jurisprudential is a somewhat strange 
development.  As Poulantzas might have said, we live in an age where the economy 
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may be determinant in the final instance, but the jurisprudential has taken over from 
the political as the dominant one.  From Habermas’ Verrechtlichung and Geltung to 
Hardt and Negri’s Empire is not as big a shift as it may appear at first blush.  
Although a cosmopolitan democracy may be a long way from empire, they are both 
new political forms, and theoretical developments increasingly circle around these 
two possibilities.  There is a new world order in statu nascendi and it may be born out 
of war and terror, but it is one that requires jurisprudential elaboration.  The 
jurisprudential norm that articulates empire receives its most concise formulation 
through an analysis of the right to humanitarian intervention as the new norm that 
gives rise to the new imperial power as a science of police.  ‘What stands behind this 
intervention’, according to Hardt and Negri, is not just a permanent state of 
emergency and exception, but a permanent state of exception justified by the appeal 
to essential values of justice’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 18).  The defining event of the 
new world order is the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and indeed an argument can be 
made that this order is more a Clintonian than Bush invention, or that, in any event, it 
represents the bipartisan position of an ‘imperial presidency’.  Through the War on 
Terror, the singular event that was Kosovo is fashioned into a ‘permanent state’ that 
enables the continuous construction of empire. 
 
For Hardt and Negri, therefore, empire is a ‘new inscription of authority’ that 
envelops the entirety of civilized space and the infinity of ethical time (Hardt & Negri 
2000: 9, 11).  The latter two concepts had been torn apart with the rise of the nation-
state, but the Germanic-Roman temper of our postmodern times is indicated by the 
symptomatic re-emergence of the concept of a just war out of which the right to 
humanitarian intervention emerges.  This right concretizes ethical rule as it envelops 
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civilized space.  Instead of ‘local mediations of the universal’ we have the ‘concrete 
universal itself’ of empire that remains nevertheless completely indeterminate (Hardt 
& Negri 2000: 19).  Hence, empire is always in crisis, as with Rome, its generation 
already a process of corruption.  The invocation of Rome could be as misleading as 
the invocation of the name of America.  American unilateralism gives rise to the 
suggestion of American imperial power or a ‘new American century’.  The collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the primacy of American power, and their willingness to use it are 
seen as symptoms of such a development.  Hardt and Negri do not see this as a return 
to ‘manifest destiny’, which is a relic of a time when America was a local mediation 
of the universal, rather they see the new concrete universal as a ‘very high tech 
machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 37, 
39).  The doctrines of humanitarian intervention and now pre-emption are there to 
control the marginal event.  But this machine could very well have been called 
America, as long as one understands by that name something other than an empirical 
nation-state. It could also be called what it prefers to call itself: ‘the coalition’.  As 
Serres put it in Rome: ‘L’empire en un mot dit le multiple inintégrable’ (Serres 
1983:105).  Empire is by definition non-unitary. 
 
‘Romulus tue Remus et Rome fut fondé (Serres 1983: 19). Empire, like Rome, is a 
‘book of foundations’.  As a book written before September 11 and October 12, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the foundational event is Kosovo.  Like Rome itself, however, 
empire is a series of foundational events.  Nevertheless, the analysis of Kosovo as an 
example of ‘intervention’ remains more crucial than that of the first Gulf War.  The 
peculiarity of Kosovo lies in the fact that it was a unilateral intervention decided by 
America, employing NATO and unauthorised by the UN Security Council, into the 
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sovereign affairs of an independent nation-state.  Without UN authorisation, and 
without any threat of imminent attack, there has been no justification under 
international law for such an intervention.  Hence, there is a need for a new form of 
legitimation: a right of humanitarian intervention.  For Hardt and Negri, this 
development was prepared by the revival of the idea of a bellum justum in the Gulf 
War where conflict took the form of a police action and where political power was 
resacralized by ethics (Hardt & Negri 2000: 12).  With Kosovo this double strategy of 
reducing conflict between states to a police action and the ethicalization of political 
power was restaged with no UN backing.  When a continued state of emergency is 
invoked as in the current War on Terror then their definition of ‘imperial power as a 
science of police that is founded on a practice of just war to address continually 
arising emergencies’ seems to find further confirmation (Hardt & Negri 2000: 18). 
 
In fact, empire or globalization seems to entail the invocation of police by definition.  
The pacification of the globe through a politico-juridical instance or instances means 
ultimately the revocation of the right even to self-defence and the regulation of all 
conflict by the police.  The real debate is whether this condition is best described as 
empire or an emergent cosmopolis or simply global order per se.  As already 
mentioned, Hardt and Negri begin their book with Kelsen, who is the neo-Kantian 
theorist of international law and the intellectual antithesis of the neo-Romantic 
version offered by Schmitt.  They argue that the United Nations plays a pivotal role in 
the final crisis of the Westphalian order by recognizing both the rights of sovereign 
state and by shifting the process of the legitimation of right itself to a supranational 
instance (Hardt & Negri 2000: 5).  This is the familiar conflict between sovereignty 
and human rights.  Whereas Kelsen wanted to see the emergence of an international 
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juridical system as the supreme source of law, Hardt and Negri want to follow the 
material structure that organizes the emergence of the supranational entity they call 
empire (Hardt & Negri 2000: 5, 6).  They then contrast a Hobbesian approach to the 
creation of a supranational instance with the Lockean proposal of a global civil 
society, and reject both for an analysis of the biopolitical production of sovereignty 
that mixes Marxian, Nietzschean, Foucauldian and Deleuzian themes.  Hence, ‘the 
source of imperial normativity is … a globalized biopolitical machine’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 40). 
 
Rather than pursuing a more detailed analysis of empire presented in the book, I 
would like to undertake a comparative analysis of their position with what they 
describe as the Lockean thematic of a global civil society, which is also one that stems 
from Montesquieu (Taylor: 1995).  What I hope to show is that the normative 
dimension can not be completely positivized out of existence by reference to the 
biopolitical or subverted by reference to the Realpolitik behind moral intervention.  
We will attempt this through a look at the events of Kosovo and their socio-
philosophical and historico-political interpretation. 
 
II 
 
The idea of the right of humanitarian intervention as the juridical key to the 
foundation of empire is as paradoxical as it is contradictory.  Even if contemporary 
empire needs no Rome, it is nevertheless true that it is America which does the 
policing role in empire as the power whose ‘primary task’ is military intervention.  
Moreover, as moral intervention prefigures military intervention even the moral 
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powers of the world – the INGOs – simply play into the hands of the ‘police 
mentality’ of an America which can only identify its enemies as terrorists (Hardt & 
Negri, 2000: 37).  Indeed, Hardt and Negri argue that in the same way that the Roman 
senators asked Augustus to assume imperial powers so too do the UN and other IGOs 
and INGOs ask America ‘to serve the role of guaranteeing and adding judicial 
efficacy to this complex process of the formation of a new supranational right’ (Hardt 
& Negri: 181).  This ‘privileged position’ is imperial and not imperialist as American 
power is not territorial and incorporative but based on guarding an open space within 
which network power operates.  This is Hardt and Negri’s version of the thesis of a 
neo-liberal empire.  Even if America, however, is in the process of creating a neo-
liberal empire or an empire lite (Ignatieff: 2003), as opposed to a territorial empire or 
an empire max, it is still the case that the ‘state of exception’ is decided by America 
on their reading.  It is not clear therefore how America as the ‘peace police’ that 
‘manages international justice’ is able to do this ‘not as a function of its own national 
motives, but in the name of a global right’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 181, 180).  Surely 
such an argument takes American power to much on its face-value and overlooks the 
struggle between a multilateral vision of world order based on cosmopolis and a 
vision based on empire.  It also over-estimates American power for, as Kosovo 
already showed and Iraq is beginning to demonstrate, there are limitations to ‘hard 
power’.  The argument has also been forcefully put by Kahn that ‘riskless warfare in 
pursuit of human rights’ is a moral contradiction (quoted in Ignatieff 2001: 162).  
Moreover, it develops no check on the ‘purity’ of this pursuit of human rights, which 
even Hardt and Negri accept too willingly not out of a lack of realism, but due to an 
aversion to discussing a multilateral global order. 
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The legal justification of a right to humanitarian intervention has been developed most 
prominently by the foremost promoter of the idea of the UN Charter system as a new 
principle of global order partially eclipsing the Westphalian principle of national 
sovereignty.  Antonio Cassese argues that a new rule of customary international law is 
emerging to deal with cases where intervention is morally justified but legal backing 
from the UN is not forthcoming because of political reasons.  The six criteria that 
must be satisfied are the following; that there are ‘gross and egregious breaches of 
human rights’ that ‘result from anarchy in a sovereign state’ where ‘the Security 
Council is unable to take any coercive action’ and where ‘all peaceful avenues’ are 
exhausted then ‘a group of states’ may take ‘armed force … for the limited purpose of 
stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights’ (Cassese 1999: 27).  
Although Cassese suggests these criteria were met in Kosovo, this view has both its 
supporters and detractors.  What is clear, however, is that they do not legitimate just 
any kind of police action, although the trend toward new rationales for the use of 
force is clear.  This trend reflects a more globalized world, but not necessarily empire.  
In what follows, we will look at the position of Habermas and Apel on intervention 
and contrast it with that of Zolo. The différend revolves around whether international 
law can be made more ‘moral’ by a doctrine relativising sovereignty or self-
determination and in that way secure better the peace of the world, or whether the 
‘moral’ is a pretext for the unilateral rule of force by the stronger party. 
 
Habermas explicitly rejects the Schmittian formula that underlies the position of 
Hardt and Negri: ‘”Whoever says humanity wants to deceive”?  He gave expression 
to his antihumanism with the famous formula: “Humanity, bestiality” … the politics 
of human rights only lets the natural struggle between nations degenerate into an 
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unholy and terrible “struggle against evil”’ (Habermas 1999: 266-7).  Whereas Zolo, 
however, uses this argument for the realist position against humanitarian intervention 
over state sovereignty, Hardt and Negri use it to suggest that humanism creates 
empire in somewhat the same way that Althusser once famously suggested that 
Stalinism was due to an outbreak of humanism.  Habermas’ position is that there is a 
gap between morality and law, and that international law itself has not caught up with 
all the foundational principles of the UN itself.  Hence, the war on Kosovo is on ‘the 
border between legality and morality’ due to the weak institutionalization of human 
rights and the lack of a supranational instance in the form of ‘a law of global citizens’ 
or ‘a democratic civil society of global citizens’ (Habermas 1999: 263, 270).  Kosovo 
is a ‘leap’ or part of a ‘learning process’ out of which the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention as a limitation on the classical doctrine of state sovereignty has emerged 
despite the ‘transitory paternalism’ and the illegal use of force (Habermas 1999: 264, 
271, and 270).  In this context, it needs to be remembered that the use of NATO 
meant that America and Europe were on the same side, even if America took the 
leading role.  Nevertheless, Habermas contrasts the European desire for the 
‘legalization of international relations’ with the American sense of ‘national mission’ 
as a world power that sees human rights in the context of power politics.  By seeing 
America as an agent of empire, Hardt and Negri have a less nationalist take on its 
position paradoxically enough compared to what they would see as the moralistic 
position of Habermas. 
 
Apel constructs his position on the Kosovo intervention in the light of ethical, legal 
and political principles.  From an ethical point of view, the failure of international law 
to adequately protect the human rights of minorities creates a failure for which ethics, 
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particularly discourse ethics, is the remedy.  This failure stems from international law 
prioritizing the sovereignty of states over human rights on the grounds that global 
peace is the pre-eminent value.  This legal problem is exacerbated by the political 
constitution of the Security Council, which meant it did not function to protect such 
rights for politico-strategical reasons. For Apel, Habermas’ argument that the solution 
to the Kosovo situation represents an anticipation of an already implied set of 
principles is too Hegelian. From his more Kantian and even Kierkegaardian 
viewpoint, the contemporary political situation requires ‘a recourse to morality in the 
sense of an ethics of responsibility’ (Apel 2001: 34).  This entails both discourse and 
if necessary force, although the ‘strategical teleology’ of force is under the dominion 
of the ‘ideal deontology’ of discourse ethics (Apel 2001: 35).  When dealing with the 
unauthorized use of force international law places emphasis on questions of necessity 
and proportionality.  In line with this orientation, Apel argues that the execution of the 
intervention ‘cannot be considered a model of police action for the protection of 
human rights’ (Apel 2001: 37).  Despite this conclusion, the intervention was a 
necessary step toward the domestication of the ‘wild globalization of the economy’ by 
the ‘second-order globalization of law and social justice’ (Apel 2001: 37).  The 
dualistic nature of the position can be contrasted with Hardt and Negri’s more 
monistic position that sees empire as constitution and, hence, interventionism as the 
moral legitimation of empire as an integral process.   
 
The pitfalls of interventionism in its own right have been most forcefully pointed out 
by Zolo in his work on Invoking Humanity, which is a direct invocation of the 
Schmittian aphorism rebutted by Habermas above: ‘Wer Menscheit sagt, will 
betrügen’ (Zolo 2002: 39).  From Zolo’s realist viewpoint influenced by systems 
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theory, the prospect of a semi-secret global permanent war beyond the control of 
international law has opened up with the attack on the Twin Towers, and that it is the 
doctrine of a just war as it has been renewed from the Gulf War to Kosovo that 
provides the moral legitimation (Zolo 2002: viii-ix).  Unlike Hardt and Negri who see 
intervention as a juridical legitimation of empire or Apel and Habermas who sees it as 
a prelude to cosmopolitan justice, Zolo sees it as a return to a Westphalian order based 
on the sovereign right of the state to make war (Zolo 2002: 72, 76). The bypassing of 
the Security Council by a coalition of forces is the end of the UN Charter system and 
the legal logic that led from the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellog pact to that 
system.   Hence, by morally legitimating what he refers to as an indiscriminate ius ad 
bellum the moralists have jeopardized global peace and elements of universal 
citizenship based on United Nations principles (Zolo 2002: 84).  More specifically, 
humanitarian interventionism has weakened the already weak institutional structure of 
the UN, rendering it an appendage of American power.  The doctrine is also more an 
emanation of the missionary and colonizing tradition of the West (Bull) than a 
distillation of a trans-historical core of empirical universals (Habermas). And thirdly 
whereas the moralists have recourse to just war, Zolo argues that war is legibus 
solutum in the nuclear age and it is indistinguishable from terrorism.  The result is that 
the Security Council is either bypassed through an act of self-authorization or 
becomes the authorizing agency for ‘privateering commissions’ (Zolo 2002: 90).  
Zolo’s realist assumptions issue, therefore, in a somewhat pacifist position. 
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III 
 
The failure of America to support the International Criminal Court and its unilateral 
intervention in Iraq that is part and parcel of its War on Terror undoubtedly heralds a 
new approach to global order in the era of ‘American primacy’.  From the ‘realist’ 
viewpoints of Hardt, Negri and Zolo, the peace police are armed with the moral 
powers supplied to them by the old doctrine of just war (Gulf War) and the new 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Kosovo).  The result for Hardt and Negri is 
empire, for Zolo it is a Westphalian order with one superpower.  The logic of all these 
positions is anti-normativist and hence the normative position is either 
instrumentalized or rendered superfluous to the production of global order.  Kelsen’s 
vision of a juridically-defined supranational instance finds its validation in the 
creation of an International Criminal Court, however powerless that may factually 
appear in the light of American ‘hard power’.  Nevertheless, the multi-lateralist 
construct of a global civil society has a normative foundation that cannot be argued 
away through instrumentalist reductionism.  The defence of a right of humanitarian 
intervention in the Kosovo situation was right in principle if not in execution, and it 
was framed in such a way that meant it was to be strictly controlled in and through 
law.  The war on Iraq was initially framed in terms of a doctrine of pre-emption as an 
innovation in the law of self-defence, and only subsequently re-interpreted in terms of 
humanitarian intervention.  But the former was only a ‘bureaucratic excuse’ 
(Wolfowitz) and the latter only a rhetorical flourish that would have no basis in any 
such right, however legally defined, as it has arisen out of the experience of Kosovo.  
For this reason, the insistence on a difference between a more legalist interpretation of 
the construction of world order and the unilateralist use of force that was too brutally 
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summarized as Europe versus America remains valid.  There is a difference between 
Kosovo and Iraq, as Habermas has pointed out, and the elimination of that difference 
through left anti-imperialist political analysis such as that of Ali (2003: 191-6) will 
not wash as the real argument needs to be fought out at the level of juridico-political 
argumentation.  If America instrumentalizes morality, international law and 
international institutions, then this can not hide the fact that it is American national 
power in an essentially Westphalian order that is in play.  To call this empire dignifies 
this construct by assuming its self-proclaimed universality.  The alternative may lack 
power, but one cannot rob it of its normative force with the argument that it plays into 
the hands of power by covering the chains with garlands of flowers.  Empire, 
American imperial power and cosmopolis are possible incarnations of global order, 
and which of the three will prevail has not yet been determined. 
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